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Abstract 
In this paper, we examine the systemic risk implications of banking institutions that are 
considered ‘Too-systemically-important-to-fail’ (TSITF). We exploit a sample of bank 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in nine EU economies between 1997 and 2007 to capture 
safety net subsidy effects and evaluate their ramifications for systemic risk. We find that 
safety net benefits derived from M&A activity have a significantly positive association with 
rescue probability, suggesting moral hazard in banking systems. We, however, find no 
evidence that gaining safety net subsidies leads to TSITF bank’s increased interdependency 
over peer banks.  
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1.     Introduction 
Bailouts of large financial institutions, in particular banks, have always caught the 
attention of the public due to their high social and economic costs (Stern and Feldman, 2004; 
Giannetti and Simonov, 2010). The term ‘too-big-to-fail’ (TBTF) was first used in a US 
congressional hearing in 1984 to justify the decision to bail out Continental Illinois National 
Bank (incurring a $1.1 billion expense to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation - FDIC) 
and also to 10 other large US banks that would have been rescued in the event of failure 
(Carrington, 1984). 
 
The recent financial crisis between 2008 and 2009 provides a timely case study for TBTF 
effects in EU banking sectors. Large scale banking rescues occurred in all major EU 
economies and those rescued banks appear as natural candidates for a TBTF study as their 
failures would have posed systemic risk to the real economy (Petrovic and Tutsch, 2009). In 
addition, European banking markets have experienced far-reaching structural changes over 
recent years as part of the process of European integration which could have exacerbated 
TBTF effects. These changes are reflected in greater product and geographical diversification 
(Barros et al., 2005; Laeven and Levine, 2007) facilitated by mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) between banks and other financial institutions that have become commonplace 
(ECB, 2000; Goddard et al., 2007).  
 
However, as banks can grow substantially via merger and acquisition (M&A) (Hawkesby 
et al., 2007), deals undertaken by these large EU banks may not only increase their market 
value but can also offer evidence for the existence of safety net subsidies associated with 
TBTF (e.g. Carbó et al., 2011; Penas and Unal, 2004). There are also concerns that these EU 
banks’ mergers can affect financial stability (Hagendorff et al., 2012b). First, systemic risk 
may increase as institutions become more interdependent due to similar business lines, 
investment portfolios, and common exposures after consolidation. Due to such 
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interdependency, when a large bank fails, its problems may be contagious and rapidly infect 
counterparties; in turn, this may pose a threat to the stability of the economy. Second, when 
banks engage in M&As they can become more complex (i.e., bancassurance or 
conglomerates) and this may lead to greater opacity posing challenges for regulators (Carbó 
et al., 2011). Larger and more complex banks may find it easier to exploit regulatory 
loopholes without being monitored appropriately. Finally, cross-border M&As within the EU 
may also complicate issues further as uncertainties regarding the jurisdiction of national 
safety net arrangements and coordination problems between regulators may arise (Hagendorff 
et al., 2012a). Evidently, all of the three pan-European banks that failed in the crisis (Dexia, 
Fortis and ING) received some form of financial assistance from different EU member state 
governments
1
. 
 
While the term TBTF may appear a misnomer - in some cases bailed-out banks have not 
been particularly large (Kaufman, 2003), from a regulatory perspective a bank’s systemic 
importance, in other words, the complexity of the business model, connectivity to others as 
well as size, is the main consideration in a bail-out rather than size per se (Bank of England, 
2009; IMF/BIS/FSB, 2009). To avoid confusion in terminology we will use the term TSITF 
in the remainder of this study, broadly encompassing TBTF and ‘too-systemically-important-
to-fail’ institutions. We present an overview of the literature in Table I, grouped according to 
the type of TSITF measure employed (asset size, market capitalization, market shares, rating 
and so on). The more recent reflect on the insights gained from the 2008-9 crisis and 
consequently consider a wider range of attributes such as business complexity, wholesale 
banking activities, substitutability of services, in addition to size when assessing systemic 
importance.  
 [Insert Table I here] 
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This paper contributes to the literature in two important ways. First, we develop an 
innovative approach to extract a measure of safety net subsidies from an auxiliary regression 
model, which examines the determinants of bank merger premiums. Previous M&A studies 
either fail to disentangle other incentives to consolidate (efficiency gains, enhanced market 
power, reduced agency costs) from potential safety net subsidies (Pennacchi, 2000), or only 
test the safety net subsidy effects associated with one specific factor such as size and ignore 
other factors that may explain such subsidies including phenomena such as: political clout, 
managerial opportunism, relaxed market monitoring and organizational flexibility (Kane, 
2010).
2
 Our approach, however, is capable of stripping out safety net subsidy gains broadly 
defined in M&As. Second, although the literature has documented a gradual increase in 
systemic risk in the EU over the past decade or so (Hawkesby et al., 2003, 2007; Brasili and 
Vulpes, 2005; Gropp and Moermann, 2004), Kane (2010) suggests that typical measures of 
systemic risk, namely indicators of interdependency between TSITF banks, have not enabled 
regulators to diagnose the root cause of financial distress correctly. In other words, regulators 
have been unable to effectively detect the build-up of systemic risk within the financial 
system. We extend the literature by providing an initial step towards analyzing the 
relationship between the change in bivariate correlations of TSITF banks’ share price returns 
and their gains in safety net subsidies via M&As.   
  
This study first uses a frontier modeling technique to capture safety net subsidy gains 
while testing for the motives of paying merger premiums in M&As. In the first test, we find 
substantial variation in the willingness of acquirer banks to pay for safety net subsidies. Our 
test also shows that EU acquiring banks pay merger premiums to a target if it will bring more 
market power; is located in a strong supervisory environment and operates in a concentrated 
market. In the second step of our analysis, we assess whether a bank that posed systemic risk 
during 2008 and 2009 paid merger premiums in the past to gain safety net subsidies, which 
are estimated from our first test. We find consistent and significant evidence that gaining 
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safety net subsidies in the pre-crisis era via M&As increases the probability of being rescued 
in the crisis. We, however, find no evidence that safety net subsidy gains via M&A lead to 
increased interdependency between TSITF and other banks, which is measured by TSITF 
bank’s share return correlations with its peers’ in each country. Our results remain consistent 
when banks’ interdependency is measured using accounting information instead of market 
prices. Overall, these findings help us understand how banks exploit national safety nets and 
increase instability in the financial system. Echoing recent legislation developments in the US 
and EU that aims to end TSITF bailouts 
3
,our results also point to the direction that there 
should be greater regulatory scrutiny of bank M&A activity as banks continue to grow in 
systemic importance. 
  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 states our research questions and develops 
our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the dataset and methodology. We present our results and 
robustness tests in Section 4. We offer concluding remarks in Section 5. 
  
2. Research Hypotheses 
Acquirers often pay more than a target’s ‘fair value’ in the consolidation process. To 
explain this phenomenon, previous studies mainly focus on the financial characteristics of the 
target, acquirer as well as the combined entity (Beatty et al., 1987; Palia, 1993; Hakes et al., 
1997; Diaz and Azofra, 2009). Other motives such as market power gains and improved 
safety net access, on the other hand, have been examined less (Hagendorff et al., 2012a; 
Brewer and Jagtiani, 2007). Our first hypothesis homes in on the fact that a bank can gain 
better access to the safety net, or in other words, increase its systemic importance post-
merger. By taking over various targets, a bank can become substantially larger, have a more 
complex business model and therefore become more interconnected with a larger number of 
counterparties in the financial system. To achieve this, a bank may pay a higher premium in a 
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merger deal for safety net subsidies (as well as other benefits) it may obtain after the 
transaction. We formulate our first hypothesis as follows: 
 H1. Safety Net Subsidies Hypothesis: Merger premiums are paid for gaining safety net 
subsidies via banking M&As. 
  
Next, we examine whether banks deliberately pay merger premiums to exploit safety net 
benefits, we first define rescued banks in the 2008-9 crises as TSITF. The identification of 
TSITF in our study is simple yet appropriate. During the recent crisis, numerous banks were 
assisted by regulators in different ways to avoid failure. Regulators justified their rescues by 
stating that these banks were systemically important to the stability of the financial systems 
and economies (Bank of England, 2009; IMF/BIS/FSB, 2009). Moreover, in general the risk 
of failure is a consequence of a set of decisions made by banks. If we examine the pattern of 
behavior of those TSITF banks over ten years pre-crisis, in other words whether they exploit 
safety nets before the crisis, we may be able to discern whether there are moral hazard 
effects.  
  
Among the few formal models of TSITF in the literature, Vassalou and Xing (2004) use 
Merton’s (1974) option pricing model to compute default measures for individual firms and 
assess the effect of default risk on equity returns. Their model shows that safety net support 
allows creditors to put some or all of their losses to safety net managers, which reduces the 
net default risk that markets for equity and debt must price. Ennis and Malek (2005) show 
that TSITF policy creates not only a risk distortion (moral hazard), but also a size distortion, 
and one distortion tends to enhance the other and vice versa. Thus, theoretically banks would 
try to become larger to exploit safety net benefits meanwhile becoming more risk-taking.  
 
We assume in our study that the amount of safety net subsidies obtained via M&As reflect 
the level of risk and systemic importance distortion banks seek from such transactions. More 
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specifically, TSITF banks pay higher merger premiums so as to obtain safety net subsidies, 
providing them with benefits unavailable to smaller counterparts, so that they cannot be 
adequately disciplined by the market (Mishkin, 2006). This results in a gradual increase in 
moral hazard that can eventually lead to their failure. This process can eventually trigger 
panics, bank runs, a full-scale financial crisis and costly bank rescues (Stern and Feldman, 
2004). We hypothesize this as follows: 
 H2. Safety Net Exploitation Hypothesis: There is a positive relationship between being 
a TSITF bank and exploiting safety net via M&As. 
  
Finally, Goodhart and Huang (1999) develop a model of the lender of last resort. They 
show that if contagion is the main concern, the central bank will have an incentive to rescue 
banks. Therefore, rescued banks pose systemic risk. In our study, TSITF banks’ exploitation 
of the safety net may result in an increase of systemic risk over time, which we measure as 
the interdependency between TSITF banks (i.e. stock return correlations among TSITF 
banks). Therefore, we summarize our final hypothesis as follows: 
 H3. TSITF Interdependency Implication Hypothesis: TSITF banks exploit safety nets 
and in turn increase their interdependency with other TSITF banks 
  
3.     Data and Methodology  
3.1 Data sources 
Between October 2008 and June 2009 a total of 12 EU countries provided ailing banks 
with various rescue packages (Stolz and Wedow, 2010; Petrovic and Tutsch, 2009). These 
countries include Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. All countries claimed that the failure of 
these banks would disrupt the provision of financial services to the real economy and have 
dire economic and social consequences.
4
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Therefore, allowing for widespread bank insolvency was not a credible policy option 
(Petrovic and Tutsch, 2009). Consequently, these rescued banks are the natural candidates for 
TSITF. In this study, we have 9 EU countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and the UK), that experienced 71 bank rescues during the 
crisis. Table II presents a list of rescued banks and outlines the rescue measures taken.
5
  
 [Insert Table II here] 
 We hand-collect information on banks’ M&As in nine EU countries between January 
1997 and December 2007 from Thomson One Banker. In total, we identify 162 M&A 
transactions by 54 acquiring banks where acquirers take full control of targets (over 50% 
share control after a transaction). Acquirers are banks or mutual credit institutions and targets 
are financial service providers (defined by Thomson One Banker as banks, insurance 
companies, asset-management firms, credit institutions and brokerages). We obtain banks’ 
accounting information from BankScope. 
  
         3.2 Extracting safety net subsidies in M&As 
Previous studies (e.g. Hagendorff et al., 2012a; Brewer and Jagtiani, 2007; Benston et al., 
1995) assume that a bank has its motives to justify the amount of premium it pays to its target 
in each M&A. Therefore, for a sample of banks the ith bank would pay: 
𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖                                                       [1] 
                                                 
Equation [1] applies ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and relates merger premium 
a bank pays to various acquiring and acquired bank-specific as well as deal-specific 
characteristics. The aforementioned studies typically do not take into account the possibility 
that banks may pay a merger premium to extend their access to the safety net. An exception is 
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Brewer and Jagtiani (2007), who measure the safety net subsidy effects associated with size 
increase. Studies that model banking safety net management, however, argue that gaining 
safety net subsidies is associated with potential increase in managerial 
opportunism/aggression, lobbying activity and more flexible organizational structure, which 
may in turn lead to the change in risk-taking behavior - and not necessarily from bank’s size 
per se (Kane, 2010; Acharya et al., 2010; Eberlein and Madan, 2010). Therefore, an OLS 
regression approach such as Equation [1] that attempts to capture safety net subsidies with 
the use of a simple bank size control variable for systemic importance post-merger seems 
somewhat limited. 
  
As such, in this study, we use a stochastic cost frontier modeling technique borrowed 
from the efficiency literature (e.g. Berger and Mester, 1997) to capture safety net subsidy 
gains broadly defined in M&As. Recently, such techniques have also been applied in other 
contexts in the banking literature. Baele et al. (2010), for instance, estimate a stochastic 
frontier to examine banks’ ‘risk inefficiency’ relative to best performing peers. A stochastic 
cost frontier model estimates the minimum possible cost (i.e. a frontier) given a set of outputs 
and assumes that each firm potentially produces at more than the minimum cost might be due 
to a degree of inefficiency. As a result, it provides estimators for the parameters of a linear 
model with a disturbance that is assumed to be a mixture of two components: a deviation 
from the cost frontier (a measure of cost inefficiency) and a stochastic error term, which have 
a strictly nonnegative and symmetric distribution, respectively.  
  
Every model makes deliberate and hard–to-defend simplifications. In interpreting our 
parsimonious experiments, we cannot rule out the possibility that omitted variables, 
measurement errors may distort the outcomes in unknown ways. Nevertheless, this model is 
applicable and more appropriate than an OLS regression model because stochastic cost 
frontier analysis in our study assumes that each acquiring bank potentially pays an extra 
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amount of merger premiums to a target after controlling for an extensive array of variables 
based on previous studies that explain the primary determinants of merger premiums paid in 
banking, excluding any safety net subsidy motives.
6
 In this case, the disturbance term of the 
model is also decomposed into a non-negative deviation from the frontier, which is safety net 
gains via each M&A; and an error term, which makes the frontier stochastic and incorporates 
measurement error and randomness of an acquiring bank’s valuation of a target firm. The 
model we use is as follows: 
     𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑊𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐴𝐺𝐸𝐶𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑇𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖 +
𝛽6𝑇𝐹𝑂𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑇𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖 + 𝛽10𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖       
 𝑢𝑖 ~ 𝑖𝑖𝑑|𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢𝑖
2 )|                                                                [2] 
                                             𝑣𝑖~𝑖𝑖𝑑 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2) 
Equation [2] relates merger premiums to various independent variables explained in 
detail below. 𝑣𝑖  is a random error term and safety net subsidy gains 𝑢𝑖  capture safety net 
gains. The term 𝑢𝑖 is assumed to follow a half normal distribution to capture non-negativity 
(truncated at zero). This stochastic cost frontier model reduces to an OLS regression model if 
the variance of the safety net subsidy gains 𝜎𝑢
2 is zero. As we will show later, this hypothesis 
is soundly rejected. The dependent variable of Equation [2] - PREM is bank merger 
premiums measured as follows: 
  
𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀 =
𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝑉×𝑠
− 1                                                                  [3] 
                                                         
where deal value is the purchase price paid by the acquirer. V is the market capitalization 
of the target 20 days before the deal if the target was a listed company.
7
 In many cases, 
however, the target was not publicly listed or the market value is not available. Although the 
literature that studies bank merger premiums tends to use book values (e.g. Hagendorff et al., 
2012a; Palia, 1993; Diaz and Azofra, 2009; Adkisson and Fraser, 1990; Cheng et al., 1989), it 
is arguably a less accurate measure because a bank’s future cash flow is not incorporated. We 
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therefore use average market/book ratios of a target’s peers (based on pre-merger asset size 
and the return on assets ratio) to adjust target’s book value of equity in the fiscal year before 
the deal announcement. The term s is the percentage of shares acquired in the deal. 
           
Following Pennacchi’s (2000) caution about the interpretations of results from M&A 
event studies, we introduce three major motivations for bank M&As (excluding safety net 
subsidies). These incentives relate to: enhanced market power, efficiency gains and 
managerial agency problems. MPOW is a target’s Lerner Index divided by the acquirer’s 
Lerner Index before the merger. The Lerner Index reflects a bank’s ability to price over its 
marginal costs to generate its interest and non-interest income (Carbó et al., 2009). MPOW 
measures potential market power gains from an M&A transaction. A positive coefficient may 
suggest that the acquirer pays a premium to the target for its relatively high market power. In 
terms of the efficiency gains, we use two profit-based and cost-based efficiency ratios to 
capture such potential: RROA is the ratio of the target’s return on assets (ROA) to the 
acquirer’s ROA; and RCIR is the ratio of the target’s cost-to-income ratio (CIR) and the 
acquirer’s CIR.8 Previous studies have reported that acquirers may prefer a target with 
efficiency potential measured with reference to either profit or cost benchmarks (Pilloff, 
1996). Agency conflicts/costs may also explain why management overpays the target in an 
M&A (Palia, 1993). AGECY measures the level of the agency conflicts/costs, which is the 
total percentage of an acquiring bank’s shares held by institutions owning 5% or more. A 
large body of literature that focuses on the effect of concentrated outside ownership (or 
blockholdings) on firm value and agency costs suggests that, under certain conditions, 
institutional ownership could increase the level of agency costs (e.g., Demsetz 1983; Lease, 
McConnell, and Mikkelson 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986 etc.). A significant and positive 
coefficient on this variable suggests that M&As are driven by agency problems in acquiring 
firms. 
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The following three independent variables in Equation [2] describe targets’ 
characteristics: TLEV measures the levels of target’s Tier 1 capital, which is the equity-to-
asset ratio in the fiscal year before the M&A announcement. Most studies report a 
significantly negative relationship between the levels of target capital and merger premiums 
paid as higher levels of capital may dilute the merger premiums paid per share (e.g. 
Hagendorff et al., 2012a; Beatty et al., 1987; Hakes et al., 1997; Diaz and Azofra, 2009; 
Brewer et al., 2007). TFOC indicates target firm’s business focus. In this study, acquiring 
firms are either banks or mutual credit institutions and targets include all types of financial 
service providers. We use the ratio of the net interest income of the target firm to its total 
operating income in the year prior to the transaction to measure the extent to which the target 
firm is focused on traditional core banking business. We assume that acquiring banks may 
pay a premium if the target generates more income from fee-based business lines, which, in 
turn, may provide greater opportunities for diversification. Studies, however, find no strong 
evidence to support this hypothesis (e.g. Diaz and Azofra, 2009; Brewer and Jagtiani, 2007). 
TGROW measures target’s pre-merger growth. It has been suggested that acquiring banks 
may prefer fast-growing targets (Cheng et al., 1989; Rhoades, 1987; Beitel et al., 2004). 
TGROW is the target’s average assets growth rate over three years prior to the merger. 9 We 
use TSUP to measure the target country’s supervisory strength. Evidence shows that 
acquirers exploit regulatory arbitrage if a target’s home country has weak regulations 
(Hagendorff et al., 2012a; Carbó et al., 2010). Following Buch and DeLong (2008) and 
Hagendorff et al. (2012a) we compile a Supervisory Strength Index for the acquirer and 
target’s countries based on the Barth et al. (2001) database on regulation and supervision. 
Supervisory Strength Index varies between 0 and 12 with higher scores indicating a banking 
system with a stronger supervisory environment and enforcement.
10
  
  
A concentrated banking market may be appealing for an acquirer as a high level of 
profitability may be maintained compared to a more competitive market. Some studies have 
found that acquiring banks pay higher premiums to targets in more concentrated markets 
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(Beatty et al., 1987; Palia, 1993). Others, however, find no significant relationship 
(Hagendorff et al., 2012a; Hakes et al., 1997; Diaz and Azofra, 2009).
 11
  We measure target’s 
market concentration using the CR3 ratio (TCON), which is the market share (in terms of 
assets) of the largest three banks in a country. 
  
The size of the target in relation to the acquirer is also included in our model. RSIZE is 
defined as the ratio of the sum of the target and acquirer's asset size divided by the acquirer’s 
assets in the year preceding the merger. The findings from the literature are mixed. Some 
studies find a significantly negative relationship suggesting that acquirers may prefer smaller 
targets so post-integration costs will be lower (Benston et al., 1995; Palia, 1993; Hakes et al., 
1997; Cheng et al, 1989; Brewer et al., 2007). In contrast, a positive and significant 
relationship can be found in other studies, which may suggest that potential economies of 
scale are sought by the acquirers (Brewer and Jagtiani, 2007; Brewer et al., 2007). 
  
Table III presents summary statistics of all variables in Equation [2]. It shows that targets 
in EU banking M&As have an average equity-to-asset ratio of 10%. They also have 
considerable fee-based business. They seem to grow quickly prior to the M&A transactions 
and tend to have greater market power (measured by the Lerner Index) compared to 
acquirers. Acquirers appear to be more profitable (higher ROA’s) but are more inefficient 
(larger CIR ratios). 
 [Insert Table III here] 
  
            3.3 A new test for safety net exploitation of TSITF banks 
In the second step of our analysis, we use a binary response model to assess whether a 
bank that posed systemic risk during 2008 and 2009 paid merger premiums in the past to gain 
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safety net subsidies. As both logit and probit model produce the same results in our study, we 
estimate the following model using a probit set-up: 
   
𝑃𝑅(𝑇𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐹𝑖) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑈𝐵𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                             [4] 
 
where TSITF is a dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if a bank posed systemic risk 
between 2008 and 2009. In this study, we focus on the potential cost that would have been 
caused if those support measures had not been implemented from a public policy’s point of 
view rather than shareholders’. Therefore, these are the banks that were actually rescued or 
supported during the crisis. Non-rescued banks as a control group take the value 0. There are 
in total 4318 banking firms in 2007 (which is also the number of firm-year observations) that 
were not involved in any rescues in 9 EU countries in our sample. 
  
Although the measure the government may (or may not) take to support a bank is 
unknown before the bailout, various banking rescue/support measures may result in different 
economic and social costs. For example, government capital injections may impose greater 
costs on taxpayers than other types of intervention such as loan guarantees etc. We therefore 
also estimate Equation [4] as a multinomial probit regression by assuming TSITF has three 
outcomes 1, 2 and 3: non-rescued banks, banks receiving state guarantees and banks that 
were recapitalized between 2008 and 2009.
12
 The explanatory variables of Equation [4] are 
defined as follows: 
            
SUBD is the sum of the safety net subsidies estimated from Equation [2] (i.e. 𝑢𝑖  ) for an 
acquiring bank between 1997 and 2007. We assume that there is a higher probability that an 
acquiring bank that posed systemic risk (was rescued) in the recent financial crisis had gained 
safety net subsidies via previous M&A activity. We also include two country level control 
15 
 
variables ASUP and ADEP. These refer to the Supervisory Strength Index (previously 
defined in section 4.2) and the Deposit Insurance Strength Index in 2007, respectively. The 
Deposit Insurance Strength Index (ADEP) is measured according to Hagendorff et al. (2012a) 
and takes a value between 0 and 3 with higher values indicating a stricter (more expensive) 
deposit insurance arrangement.
13
 Bail-out policy is expected to vary in different countries. 
We control for these regulatory settings as it may be the case that in weaker regulatory 
environments there are more banks that may pose stability threats. Table IV presents 
summary statistics of all variables in Equation [4].  
 [Insert Table IV here] 
   
          3.4 A new test for interdependency among TSITF banks 
Having examined the systemic risk implications of TSITF in the second step of our 
analysis, we re-examine this issue in a different way. We first follow the traditional approach 
measuring TSITF bank and peers’ bivariate share return correlations in each country between 
1997 and 2007 (Hawkesby et al., 2007; De Nicolo and Kwast, 2002).  Next, we estimate each 
TSITF bank’s average correlation with its peers in each year - this measures the 
interdependency the TSITF bank had with other peer banks. We then take the year-on-year 
difference of the correlations to measure change in interdependency (systemic risk change) of 
a TSITF bank (variable ∆𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃 ). As the number of banks that are publically listed is 
limited, we are not able to carry out a comprehensive test. Here we only examine the 
correlation coefficient of SUBDt and ∆𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑡+1  and assume that gaining safety net 
subsidies could lead to a significant increase in interdependency (bearing in mind the 
reservations about the incompleteness of our systemic risk measure as noted by Kane (2010)).  
  
4.   Empirical Results 
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          4.1 Extracting safety net subsidies in M&As - results     
Table V shows the summary statistics of safety net gains derived from the decomposition 
of the error from the stochastic cost frontier model for each bank with a higher value 
indicating a larger portion of merger premium paid for safety net benefits. In total, we 
identify 54 banks and in 9 countries that have paid merger premiums to gain safety net 
benefits, among whom Société Générale and HSBC Holdings appear to have paid the most. 
Moreover, banks that pay premiums larger than average for safety net subsidies also tend to 
focus more on cross-border M&As (e.g. Erste Group Bank; BNP Paribas; and Standard 
Chartered). 
 [Insert Table V here] 
 For completeness, we also show in Table VI the results that examine the commonly used 
determinants of merger premiums. As the distribution of merger premiums may be influenced 
by some large deals, we apply 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentile winsorization to remove the outliers. We 
find that market power gains seem to explain the amount of merger premiums paid. The 
coefficient on MPOW is strongly positive and significant. The coefficient on TSUP is 
positive and significant. This result contradicts the findings from previous studies and 
suggests that EU acquirers are willing to pay a higher premium for a target located in a strong 
supervisory environment. Finally, TCON is also positive, which is consistent with the 
findings from Beatty et al. (1987) and Palia (1993) who find that acquirers pay higher 
premiums for targets based in more concentrated markets. The overall estimation of this 
stochastic cost frontier model is efficient in testing for the determinants of M&A premiums, 
as indicated by the variance of safety net subsidy gains being significantly different from 
zero. 
  [Insert Table VI here] 
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          4.2 A new test for safety net exploitation of TSITF banks - results 
          4.2.1 The robustness test of safety net gains 
Before formally testing the systemic consequences of exploiting safety net via M&As, it 
is necessary to test whether the cost function frontier model estimates safety net gains in a 
robust manner as Equation [2] may suffer from omitted variable issues.  
  
We therefore test the correlations between a bank’s total safety net subsidies gained via 
mergers prior to the crisis SUBD and various indicators that measure the systemic importance 
(i.e. size, complexity and interconnectedness according to IMF/BIS/FSB, 2009) of a banking 
institution in 2007 in 9 EU banking systems. We expect a positive relationship between 
SUBD and bank’s systemic importance. First of all, we use two separate size measures as at 
December 2007: the first is an absolute measure ABSIZE that is the natural logarithm of a 
bank’s assets; the second measure is a market share indicator MAKSH – bank assets size 
divided by total assets of the banking sector. The relevance of size will also depend on a 
bank’s complexity and interconnectedness (IMF/BIS/FSB, 2009). A complex bank may 
simultaneously have banking, insurance and securities subsidiaries; operate internationally; 
and/or have exposures to a broad array of financial products and markets (Bank of England, 
2009; IMF/BIS/FSB, 2009). We use a variable COMP to measure a bank’s complexity in 
December 2007, which is the natural logarithm of the number of an acquiring bank’s total 
subsidiaries. Interconnectedness, on the other hand, measures contractual relations with other 
institutions. We use two complementary measures: the first ABCONN is the natural 
logarithm of an acquiring bank’s total interbank deposits in December 2007. The second, 
RECONN is the ratio of acquiring bank’s interbank deposits divided by total bank deposits 
(excluding its own share) in December 2007. Table VII shows that SUBD is mildly correlated 
with five systemic importance indicators. Considering the size of our sample, our results from 
the frontier model appear to be robust. 
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 [Insert Table VII here] 
          4.2.2 Probit Regression Results  
Table VIII shows the results from the estimation of Equation [4] using a binomial probit 
regression model, which analyzes the probability that a TSITF bank (defined as banks that 
were rescued in 2008 and 2009) paid merger premiums to gain safety net subsidy benefits.  
  
We report marginal effects of the estimation. A significant finding shows that gaining 
safety net subsidies in the pre-crisis era via M&As increases the probabilities of being 
rescued in the crisis. This therefore confirms our Safety Net Exploitation Hypothesis. We 
also find that the regulatory regime (measured using the Supervisory Strength Index and 
Deposit Insurance Strength Index) has a positive and significant influence on the presence of 
TSITF banks. Overall, all specifications exhibit a relatively high classification accuracy. For 
example, the area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve is on average 
above 91%.
14
  
[Insert Table VIII here] 
 Table IX shows the results from the estimation of Equation [4] using a multinomial 
probit regression model instead, which analyzes the probability of several outcomes of being 
a TSITF bank. In each estimation, TSITF=1 (non-rescued bank) is the base outcome. We find 
evidence that gaining safety net subsidies tends to increase the probabilities of being 
recapitalized (including nationalization or a forced merger) as well as getting state 
guarantees. Moreover, there is evidence that a strict supervisory regime and a generous 
deposit insurance scheme are more likely to offer failing banks state guarantees rather than 
capital injections. 
 [Insert Table IX here] 
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 To test the robustness of our estimation, we first use an ordinary least-squares (OLS) 
regression model instead of cost function frontier model to estimate Equation [2]. In this 
case, residuals from the OLS estimation are treated as safety net subsidy gains (with no 
random errors separated). We then repeat our second step analysis using the residuals from 
the OLS estimation as the variable SUBD in Equation [4]. Table X Panel A shows weaker 
evidence that gaining safety net subsidies significantly increases the possibilities of being a 
rescued bank in the crisis. Weaker results may be explained by the inclusion of random errors 
in the variable SUBD in this estimation, which in turn suggests the necessity of applying a 
stochastic frontier modeling technique in our study.  
  
Secondly, the dummy variable of Equation [4] TSITF may not include some systemically 
important banks that did not seek any assistance during the crisis. We, therefore, replace the 
dependent variable with an alternative TSITF indicator: a bank’s total asset weighted by its 
home country’s GDP in 2007 and run Equation [4] using OLS regression. Table X Panel B 
shows that our results remain consistent and significant. 
  
Next, we divide our sample into two sub-samples and re-estimate Equation [4] using a 
binomial probit regression model. The underlying reason why we choose this approach is that 
our results may be influenced by countries that experience more bank M&A transactions. 
Sub-sample I includes Austria, Belgium, Greece, Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden, where 
each country, on average, has a smaller number of bank M&As (50 transactions in total 
between 1997 and 2007); Sub-sample II includes France, Germany and the UK, that have 112 
transactions between 1997 and 2007. Table X Panel C shows that in obtaining safety net 
subsidies banks significantly increase the possibility of being rescued and the results appear 
significant for both samples. This suggests that our results are not driven by the sample size.  
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To control for the potential effects of omitted variables that may also lead to the rescue of 
a bank during the crisis, we use a two-stage approach to test the endogeneity of the 
independent variable SUBD in Equation [4] according to Rivers and Vuong (1988). In the 
first stage, we estimate an OLS regression SUBD on two instrumental variables: MAVAL 
(bank’s total M&A deal value) and MANUM (bank’s past M&A deal number) in natural 
logarithm between 1997 and 2007, which explain the amount of safety net subsidies gained 
via M&As but are uncorrelated with bank rescue. The residuals of the regression are saved 
and added to Equation [4] as an additional independent variable in the second stage 
estimation. The null hypothesis of this endogeneity test is that SUBD is exogenous if the 
coefficient of the residuals RESID in the second probit estimation is insignificantly different 
from zero. Table X Panel D presents our first and second stage results. Panel D first reports 
the coefficients for the instrumental variables of the OLS regression, which are both 
significantly different from zero. Panel D then reports the marginal effects of the estimation 
of Equation [4]. While the coefficient (not reported in the table) as well as marginal effects 
of RESID are insignificantly different from zero, our main results remain consistent and 
significant. 
  
In our M&As sample, we have both cross-border and domestic M&A deals. Due to the 
fact that cross-border M&As can be complicated and involve more than one banking 
supervisor, the safety net implications may also vary as a result. Consequently, it is necessary 
to test whether these two types of transactions adversely affect financial stability to a 
different extent. Instead of using the independent variable SUBD of Equation [4], we use two 
separate variables CROSUBD and DOMSUB, which are the sum of the safety net benefits 
for each bank from the cross-border and domestic deals respectively. Table X Panel E reports 
that in all the estimations this relationship is significantly positive for both cross-border and 
domestic transactions. Therefore, the results remain consistent and there is no evidence that 
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systemically important banks are more likely to gain safety net subsidies in different types of 
M&A transactions. 
 
Since we test in Panel D that a bank’s total M&A deal value and number (between 1997 
and 2007) explain safety net subsidies, we also need to further examine whether our findings 
only suggest size distortion other than other aspects such as complexity and interdependence. 
We replace the independent variable SUBD of Equation [4] with AVSUBD, which is the 
average value of a bank’s subsidy benefits between 1997 and 2007. Table X Panel F shows 
that our results remain consistent and significant. 
  
Our M&As in the sample include consolidations between banks as well as non-deposit 
taking financial institutions. It is possible that safety net implications are different if the target 
is a non-deposit taking firm. We rerun Equation [4] using two separate variables instead of 
SUBD: BANKSUBD and NBANKSUB, which are the sum of the safety net benefits for each 
bank from the bank-bank deals and bank-non bank deals respectively. Table X Panel G 
reports that the relationship is significantly positive for both bank-bank and bank-non bank 
mergers. Therefore, the results remain consistent. 
[Insert Table X here]  
There is a growing policy consensus in the US and EU that compensation practices and 
bonus payments in particular have promoted excessive risk-taking at financial firms and, 
thus, played an important role in causing the recent financial crisis (Financial Stability Board, 
2009; the Committee of European Banking Supervisors, 2010). Therefore, we use European 
banks’ CEO remuneration data compiled by Vallascas and Hagendorff (2013) to see whether 
there is a positive relationship between CEO cash bonus payments and merger premiums as 
CEOs may be driven by their personal incentives to secure M&A deals by over-paying for 
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targets. We add one remuneration variable LGBONUS to Equation [2], which is the 
logarithmic transformation of 1 plus the total cash bonus received by the CEO. We also add 
AGE that is the log transformation of CEO age - to control for personal traits. Due to the fact 
that the level of CEO pay disclosure varies widely across Europe, our sample size is reduced 
to only 54 M&As. We re-estimate Equation [2] with these two additional variables using the 
stochastic cost frontier model. Table XI shows that the coefficients of LGBONUS and AGE 
are insignificantly different from zero. Also the explanatory power of the model is weaker 
probably due to the smaller sample size. Nevertheless, when we re-run Equation [4] the 
results are unchanged after using SUBD derived from the first stage estimation.
15
 
 [Insert Table XI here] 
There is a literature that follows Merton (1974) to derive a measure of the bank safety net 
from the cost of deposit insurance modeled derived from the price of a put option on a bank’s 
assets (e.g. Ronn and Verma, 1986; Carbó et al., 2008). The per-period flow of safety net 
benefits that bank stockholders enjoy can be defined as a ‘fair’ insurance premium (IPP) 
expressed per dollar of a bank’s deposits (Carbó et al., 2008). To validate our measure of 
safety net subsidies, we first measure changes in IPP (i.e. ∆IPP) surrounding the 
consolidation, which is the difference between an acquiring bank’s IPP in the year of the 
merger and one year prior to the deal. We then test the correlations between ∆IPP and safety 
net gains via each M&A estimated by Equation [2]. In total, we have 59 observations. The 
correlation coefficient between these two variables is 0.22 and significant at 10% level, 
suggesting a moderate and positive relationship, which supports the claims to some extent 
that banks gain safety net subsidies via M&As.
15
 
 
4.3 A new test for interdependency among TSITF banks- results 
Table XII shows the results from our test that examines whether gaining safety net 
subsidies leads to TSITF bank’s increased interdependency over peer banks. As not all TSITF 
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banks were listed, we reduce our observations from 162 to 86. On average, ∆𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃 has a 
0.049 mean value.
16
 The correlation coefficient between these two variables is 0.08, 
indicating no clear relationship. We also increase the gap from one year to two or three years 
to re-estimate ∆𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃 assuming gaining safety net subsidies may affect this systemic risk 
measure over the medium term. Again, we cannot find any significant link.
15
 These results 
reject our TSITF Interdependency Implication Hypothesis and show that TSITF banks that 
gain safety net subsidies via M&A do not appear to have any impact on interdependency with 
peer banks. 
 [Insert Table XII here] 
 However, this test for TSITF banks’ interdependency suffers from the drawback that only 
listed TSITF banks are examined. We therefore use all TSITF banks’ balance sheet 
information to calculate aggregate Z-scores for each country and year as a systemic risk 
indicator between 1997 and 2007.
17
 This measure is a proxy for the joint probability of failure 
for TSITF banks in each country and is consistent with the definition of systemic risk 
potential based on the strength of total interdependency among systemically important 
institutions (De Nicolo et al., 2004). We then measure the change in total interdependency by 
estimating the year-on-year percentage change of aggregate Z-scores and examine the 
correlation coefficient of SUBDt (estimated from Equation [2] using frontier modeling) and 
∆𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑡+1.
18
 The correlation coefficient between these two variables is 0.112, which again 
shows no significant relationship.  
 
5.     Conclusions 
There has been growing interest on how to monitor and discipline ‘too-systemically-
important-to-fail’ (TSITF) banks so as to prevent future costly bail-outs. This paper 
contributes to the literature by addressing three highly policy-relevant and related research 
questions: 
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1)     Do banks pay higher M&A premiums for safety net benefits? 
2)     Does exploitation of safety net benefits explain bank rescues in the 2008-9 crises? 
3)     Does interdependency between TSITF banks have implications for systemic risk? 
  
We first examine the determinants of bank merger premiums by using a frontier modeling 
technique to strip-out a safety net subsidy measure.  In total, we identify 162 deals where 
premiums are paid for safety net subsidy benefits. Second, we incorporate our safety net 
subsidy measures in a probit model that tests for the probability of being a systemically 
important bank (defined as banks rescued during the recent crisis). We find that safety net 
subsidy benefits derived from M&A activity have a significant and positive association with 
rescue probability. Direct evidence is found that merger premiums are paid to obtain safety 
net subsidies that have adverse systemic risk implications. Finally, we evaluate traditional 
measures of systemic risk by examining the relationship between safety net subsidy effects 
and interdependency between TSITF banks post-merger. We do not find any significant 
relationship suggesting that stock price return correlations for systematically important banks 
are not linked to safety net subsidies. This result further questions the efficacy of using stock-
return correlations as an appropriate indicator of banking sector systemic risk.  
  
A number of robustness tests show that the frontier technique is an appropriate approach 
for estimating safety net subsidies and our results remain consistent when banks’ 
interdependency is measured by accounting measures instead of market information.  
  
Our study contributes to the ongoing financial reform policy debate relating to 
minimizing the likelihood of taxpayer bailouts of TSITF banks in the future.
19
 First, we 
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suggest that banks’ M&A activity needs to be carefully reviewed not only for its competition 
implications but more importantly for its financial stability implications.
20
 Moreover, if banks 
gain safety net subsidy benefits via M&A activity, such benefits need to be taxed to 
discourage banks to grow excessively. Third, our study suggests that commonly used 
measures are unable to measure the systemic risk that TSITF banks pose. More research is 
needed to measure banking systemic risk appropriately so it is monitored effectively and 
regulators can determine appropriate capital requirements for institutions that pose such risks.  
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FOOTNOTES 
1
 Dexia was rescued for the second time in September 2011 by a support program 
coordinated between French, Belgium and Luxembourg authorities. 
 
2
 For example, Brewer and Jagtiani (2007) relate banking merger premiums to acquiring 
banks’ size change dummy variables. They argue that the amount of premiums paid for 
reaching certain size thresholds reflects the perceived benefits of safety net subsidies. Some, 
however, propose that acquiring banks will obtain safety net subsidies when they pay more 
for targets that have greater covariance with their own profitability (as well as higher profit 
variance) (Hagendorff et al., 2012a; Benston et al., 1995). These studies, however, find no 
evidence to support this hypothesis.  
 
3
 Provisions in the U.S. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
2010 (otherwise known as Dodd-Frank) seek to end taxpayer bailouts of banks and other 
financial institutions. Similar provisions are also included in the UK’s Financial Services Bill 
(2011) that was enacted in 2012.    
 
4
 It has become a usual approach for banking regulators to provide support measures 
when handling banking crises. See for example (Giannetti and Simonov, 2010; Hoshi and 
Kashyap, 2008; Berger et al., 2010) for detailed accounts of the regulators’ responses in 
various countries since the 1990s. 
 
5
 We exclude Ireland, Luxembourg and Spain from our sample due to incomplete 
information.  Ireland had 6 banks that were rescued (Allied Irish Bank, Anglo Irish Bank, 
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Bank of Ireland, Postbank, EBS Building Society, Irish Nationwide Building Society), but 
these were excluded from our analysis because of limited M&A information. Spain and 
Luxembourg only provided state guarantees to Caja Castilla-La Mancha and capital 
injections into Fortis Banque Luxembourg respectively. Therefore, banks from these two 
countries are also excluded.      
 
6
 Controlling for a broad range of independent variables is important from an 
econometric point of view as we can mitigate omitted variable issues (to a certain extent).  
 
7
 Market capitalization may respond to information leakage (if any) before M&As. 
Therefore, merger premiums measured may not be accurate in this case. We also use 
companies’ market capitalization 30, 40 or 50 days before the M&A announcement 
alternatively to calculate the merger premiums, the results, nevertheless, from the stochastic 
frontier model remain consistent.   
 
8
 CIR measures a bank or financial firm’s cost efficiency in terms of how much 
operational cost (excluding interest expenses and loan-loss provisions) is incurred to generate 
its income before loan-loss provisions.    
 
9
 We also use core deposit growth rate to proxy target’s growth potential as suggested by 
Cheng et al. (1989) and find similar results.   
 
10
 Target’s home country’s supervisory strength index (TSUP) is an equally-weighted 
sum of 12 components, which include: banks disclose risk management procedures; risk-
weights are in line with Basel guidelines; the capital-asset ratio varies with credit risk; the 
capital-asset ratio varies with market risk; there is a formal definition of ‘non-performing 
loan’; there are automatic mechanisms to sanction directors and managers; the supervisory 
agency can order directors/management to make provisions to cover losses; the supervisory 
agency can suspend the distribution of dividends, bonuses, or management fees; the latter has 
been enforced in the past five years; the supervisory agency can declare a bank insolvent; the 
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agency can suspend ownership rights of a problem bank; the supervisory agency can take 
measures aimed at bank restructuring and reorganization.  
11
 Note that there is a related literature that focuses on the measurement of bank 
competition (e.g. Schaeck et al., 2009). However, a further investigation of this matter is 
beyond the scope of this study and we assume that greater concentration correlates positively 
with less competition. We believe this is justified in our context as we only focus on a small 
set of predominantly large and complex institutions with fundamentally different business 
models from those observed in small savings and cooperative banks that operate locally.  
12
 If a bank received state guarantees as well as capital, we classify it as ‘bank that was 
recapitalized’. Some banks were nationalized or forced to merge with other banks as rescue 
measures. They were, however, too few to be included as one of the outcomes for a 
multinomial probit regression. As these banks meanwhile received capital injection from their 
governments to be nationalized or for the merger deals, we classify these banks as ‘banks that 
were recapitalized’.  
 
13
 Acquiring bank’s home country’s Deposit Insurance Strength index (ADEP) in 2007 is 
an equally-weighted sum of 3 components as follows: there is an explicit deposit insurance 
system; deposit insurance premiums are risk-adjusted and the deposit insurance system 
requires co-insurance. 
 
14
 Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves are used to describe and compare the 
performance of diagnostic technology and diagnostic algorithms. In this study, an area of 100 
under the ROC curve would imply completely deterministic bail out probabilities.  
 
15
 Results of these robustness tests are not presented in the paper. They are available upon 
request. 
 
16
 In general, average stock price correlations for all TSITF banks in 6 EU countries 
(Sweden, Portugal and Netherlands are excluded due to lack of data) increase from 0.317 in 
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1997 to 0.395 and 0.471 in 2007 and 2008. This is consistent with findings from Brasili and 
Vulpes (2005), Gropp and Moermann (2004), Hawkesby et al.(2003), Hawkesby et al. 
(2007). 
 
17
 See De Nicolo et al. (2004) for details.  
18
 The results are not shown here to preserve space and they are available from the authors 
on request. 
19
 For example, see Feldman and Stern (2010) and Blinder (2010) for a review of The 
Squam Lake Report on financial reform. 
20
 In the US, Dodd-Frank has made changes to the review of mergers and acquisitions that 
allow the Federal Reserve to consider financial stability implications of such actions. The act 
also refines rules on the maximum size a financial firm can achieve through merger or 
acquisition. 
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Table I. Summary of TSITF studies classified by TSITF thresholds employed 
TSITF threshold List of studies Details of thresholds 
Size measured by assets Mayer (1975)  Large banks 
 Kane (2000)  the 12 largest banks in the US 1991-
1998 
 Spiegel and Yamori (2004)  the 10 largest banks in Japan 1995-
1998 
 Shull and Hanweck (2001)  the 10 largest banks in the US  
 Brewer and Jagtiani (2007)  a bank’s total assets exceed $100 
billion in the US 1991-2004 
 the largest 11 banks in the US 1991-
2004 
 Rime (2005) 
 
 logarithm of a bank’s assets in 21 
industrialized countries 1999-2003 
 Völz and Wedow (2011)  a bank’s monthly asset value 
provided by Moody’s in 24 countries 
2002-2007 
Size measured by market 
capitalisation 
Kane (2000)  the largest 12 banks in the US 1991-
1998 
 Brewer and Jagtiani (2007)  a bank’s total market capitalization 
exceeds $20 billion in the US 1991-
2004 
 Völz and Wedow (2011)  a bank’s market capitalization in 24 
countries 2002-2007 
Size measured by asset market 
share 
Carrington (1984) 
Sprague (1986) 
O’Hara and Shaw (1990) 
Flannery and Sorescu (1996) 
Black et al. (1997) 
Morgan and Stiroh (2005) 
 the largest 11 banks in the US in 
terms of asset market share (bank’s 
assets/total banking assets) 1984 
 Penas and Unal (2004)   a bank’s assets exceed two percent of 
whole banking assets 
  Rime (2005)  a bank’s assets/total banking assets in 
21 industrialized countries 1999-2003 
Size is measured by the level 
of  industrial output 
Hughes and Mester (1993)  a bank’s commercial and industrial 
loans 
Systemic importance measured 
by rating 
Soussa (2000)  a bank’s Fitch IBCA Support Rating 
1 or 2 
- to be continued - 
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TSITF threshold List of studies Details of thresholds 
Systemic importance measured by 
various criteria 
Todd and Thomson (1990)  a bank’s interbank exposure 
 
 De Nicolo and Kwast (2002) 
 
 22 large and complex banking 
organizations in the US 1988-
1999 
 have significant on and off 
balance sheet activities 
 offer a broad range of products 
and services at the domestic and 
international levels 
 participate extensively in large 
value payment and settlement 
systems 
 are of substantial size 
 
 Kaufman (1994, 1996, 2003) 
 
 a bank’s deposits provide a large 
share of money supply 
 banks that are the largest lenders 
to households, businesses, and 
governments 
 banks that operate much of the 
payment system 
 banks that are closely 
interconnected to each other 
through interbank deposits and 
loans 
 Völz and Wedow (2011)  a bank’s assets/GDP in 24 
countries 2002-2007 
 Tarashev et al. (2009)  a financial institutions’ 
probability of default (e.g. 
Moody’s KMV) 
 degree of size concentration  (e.g. 
liabilities/total market liabilities)  
 a financial institutions’ exposure 
to common or systematic risk 
factors (imposing a single-
common-factor structure on the 
Moody’s KMV estimate of the 
institution’s asset-return 
correlations) 
 Bank of England (2009)  size (e.g. a bank’s total 
assets/total banking assets) 
 interconnectedness (e.g. a bank’s 
interbank liabilities/ total banking 
assets) 
 IMF/BIS/FSB (2009)  size (e.g. a bank’s total assets and 
liabilities/GDP) 
 lack of substitutability  
 interconnectedness (e.g. 
consolidated international claims, 
CDS) 
 leverage 
 liquidity risks and large 
mismatches 
 complexity 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
Table II. List of rescued banks in 9 EU countries between October 2008 and June 2009 
The table presents a list of banks in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Sweden and the UK that were rescued by their own governments (Dexia’s state guarantees were provided by 
Belgium, France and Luxembourg jointly) between October 2008 and June 2009.  
Country Name of the bank Rescue measures 
Austria Erste Bank Group AG State guarantees (Euro 6 billion) 
Recapitalisation (Euro 1 billion) 
 Kommunalkredit AG State guarantees (Euro 5.2 billion) 
Recapitalisation (Euro 1.2 billion) 
Nationalisation on 5th January, 2009 
 Austrian Clearingbank AG State guarantees (Euro 4 billion) 
 Volksbanken AG State guarantees (Euro 3 billion) 
Recapitalisation (Euro 1 billion) 
 Raiffeisen Zentralbank AG State guarantees (Euro 4.25 billion) 
Recapitalisation (Euro 1.75 billion) 
 Hypo Alpe-Adria-Bank 
 International AG 
State guarantees (Euro 1.35 billion) 
Recapitalisation (Euro 0.9 billion) 
Belgium Dexia State guarantees (Euro 150 billion)a 
Recapitalisation (Euro 3 billion) 
 Fortis State guarantees (Euro 150 billion) 
Recapitalisation (Euro 15.9 billion) 
 Fortis NV/SA Recapitalisation (Euro 9.4 billion) 
Nationalisation on 5th October, 2008 
Acquisition by BNP Paribas 
 Fortis Bank Netherlands NV Recapitalisation (Euro 2.04 billion) 
 KBC Recapitalisation (Euro 7 billion) 
 Ethias Group Recapitalisation (Euro 1.5 billion) 
France Dexia State guarantees (Euro 150 billion) a 
Recapitalisation (Euro 3 billion) 
 Banque Fédérale des Banques 
 Populaires 
  
Recapitalisation (Euro 0.95 billion) 
Access to Euro 50 billion emergency  Loans 
Merger with Caisse Nationale des Caisses 
 d'epargne with Euro 5 billion capital injection 
 BNP Paribas SA Recapitalisation (Euro 2.55 billion) 
Access to Euro 50 billion emergency loans 
 Caisse Nationale des Caisses 
 d'epargne (CNCE) 
Recapitalisation (Euro 1.1 billion) 
Access to Euro 50 billion emergency loans 
Merger with Banque Federale des Banques 
 Populaires with Euro 5 billion capital injection 
- to be continued - 
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Country Name of the bank Rescue measures 
 Crédit Agricole Recapitalisation (Euro 3 billion) 
Access to Euro 50 billion emergency loans 
 Crédit Mutuel Recapitalisation (Euro 1.2 billion) 
Access to Euro 50 billion emergency loans 
 Société Générale SA Recapitalisation (Euro 1.7 billion) 
Access to Euro 50 billion emergency loans 
 Banque PSA Finance Access to Euro 50 billion emergency loans 
 Caisse centrale du Credit 
 Immobilier de France 
Access to Euro 50 billion emergency loans 
 GE Capital SAS Access to Euro 50 billion emergency  loans 
 Groupe RCI Banque Access to Euro 50 billion emergency loans 
 Societe des Paiements Pass- S2P Access to Euro 50 billion emergency loans 
Germany Aareal Bank State guarantees (Euro 4 billion) 
Recapitalisation (Euro 0.53 billion) 
 Bayern LB State guarantees (Euro 15 billion) 
 HSH Nordbank AG State guarantees (Euro 30 billion) 
Recapitalisation (Euro 3 billion) 
 Hypo Real Estate AG State guarantees (Euro 52 billion) 
 IKB State guarantees (Euro 5 billion) 
 SdB State guarantees (Euro 6.7 billion) 
 Sachsen LB State guarantees (Euro 2.75 billion) 
 Nord LB State guarantees (Euro 20 billion) 
 Commerzbank AG Recapitalisation (Euro 10 billion) 
Greece Agricultural Bank of  Greece SA Recapitalisation (Euro 0.675 billion) 
 Alpha Bank SA Recapitalisation (Euro 0.95 billion) 
 Aspis Bank SA Recapitalisation (Euro 0.09 billion) 
 Attica Bank SA Recapitalisation (Euro 0.1 billion) 
 EFG Eurobank Ergasias SA Recapitalisation (Euro 0.95 billion) 
 General Bank of Greece SA Recapitalisation (Euro 0.18 billion) 
 Millennium Bank SA Recapitalisation (Euro 0.065 billion) 
 National Bank of Greece SA Recapitalisation (Euro 0.35 billion) 
 Piraeus Bank SA Recapitalisation (Euro 0.37 billion) 
 Proton Bank SA Recapitalisation (Euro 0.079 billion) 
Netherlands Fortis Bank Nederland  NV 
 
 
State guarantees (Euro 7.85 billion) 
Recapitalisation (Euro 1.96 billion) 
Nationalisation on 3rd October, 2008 
 ING Bank NV State guarantees (Euro 11.4 billion) 
 NIBC Bank N.V. State guarantees (Euro 4.8 billion) 
-  to be continued - 
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Country Name of the bank Rescue measures 
 SNS Bank N.V. 
 
State guarantees (Euro 5.488 billion) 
Recapitalisation (Euro 0.75 billion) 
 Aegon N.V. Recapitalisation (Euro 3 billion) 
 ING Groep N.V Recapitalisation (Euro 10 billion) 
Portugual Banco Espirito Santo State guarantees (Euro 1.5 billion) 
 Banco Finantia State guarantees (Euro 0.1billion) 
 Banco Internacional do Funchal State guarantees (Euro 055 billion) 
 Banco Invest State guarantees (Euro 0.025 billion) 
 Banco Privado Portugues State guarantees (Euro 0.45 billion) 
 Caixa Geral de Depositos State guarantees (Euro 2 billion) 
 Banco Portugues de Negocios S.A Nationalisation on 11th November, 2008 
Sweden Carnegie Investment Bank AB 
 
State guarantees 
State loans (Euro 0.225 billion) 
 SBAB State guarantees 
 Swedbank AB State guarantees 
 Swedbank Hypotek AB State guarantees 
 Volvofinans Bank AB State guarantees 
UK Abbey National Plc         State guarantees 
 Barclays Bank Plc State guarantees 
 HBOS State guarantees 
 HSBC Bank Plc State guarantees 
 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc 
 
State guarantees 
Recapitalisation (Euro 19 billion) 
 Nationwide Building Society State guarantees 
 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc  
 
State guarantees 
Recapitalisation (Euro 22.9 billion) 
 Standard Chartered Bank State guarantees 
 Northern Rock Plc Nationalisation on 22nd February, 2008 
 Bradford and Bingley’s  Nationalisation on 29th September, 2009 
(Source: Petrovic and Tutsch, 2009) 
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       Table III. Summary statistics of variables in Equation [2]  
Summary statistics of variables in Equation [2] 
Variable Description Mean Median StDev No. of 
observations 
PREM Merger premiums. See Equation [3] for details 1.126 0.825 1.369 162 
MPOW Market power difference between acquirer and target 2.324 1.192 5.703 162 
RROA Profit efficiency difference between acquirer and target 1.978 1.452 1.68 162 
RCIR Cost efficiency difference between acquirer and target 1.116 1.011 0.653 162 
AGECY Percentage of acquirer’s block shareholders  0.167 0.130 0.167 162 
TLEV Target’s equity-to-asset ratio 0.104 0.075 0.095 162 
TFOC Target’s interest income divided by its operating income 0.611 0.636 0.213 162 
TGROW Target’s 3 years average pre-merger asset growth 11.90% 7.60% 0.191 162 
TSUP Target’s home country Supervisory Strength Index 6.65 6 2.3 162 
TCON Target’s home country 3-bank assets concentration (CR3) 
ratio  
38% 28% 0.056 162 
RSIZE Total asset of acquirer and target divided by acquirer’s   1.143 1.016 0.313 162 
 
 
 
 
Table IV. Summary statistics of variables in Equation [4] 
Summary statistics of variables in Equation [4] 
Variable Description Mean Median Maximum Minimum StDev No. of 
observations 
SUBD Sum of the safety net benefits  0.001 0 0.481 0 0.014 4380 
ASUP Acquirer’s home country’s 
Supervisory Strength Index  4.6548 4 10 4 1.2613 4380 
ADEP Acquirer’s home country Deposit 
Insurance Strength Index 1.1667 1 2 1 0.3727 4380 
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Table V.  Summary statistics of safety net subsidy measure in M&As  
Country Bank name 
Total 
Subsidy 
Average 
Subsidy 
Cross-border 
Subsidy 
Domestic 
Subsidy 
Austria Bank Austria-UniCredit Bank Austria AG 0.019 0.019 0 0.019 
 
BAWAG PSK Group 0.084 0.042 0.036 0.048 
 
Bank Styria 0.023 0.023 0.023 0 
 
Erste Group Bank AG 0.297 0.037 0.275 0.022 
 
Meinl Bank AG 0.020 0.020 0.020 0 
 
Raiffeisen Zentralbank Oesterreich AG - 
RZB 0.147 0.036 0.147 0 
 
Sparkasse Niederoesterreich 0.026 0.026 0 0.026 
 
Volksbanken Holding regGenmbH 0.065 0.032 0.043 0.022 
Belgium Almanij 0.019 0.019 0 0.019 
 
Banque Artesia-Artesia Bank 0.015 0.015 0.015 0 
 
Dexia 0.097 0.032 0.097 0 
 
Fortis 0.038 0.038 0.038 0 
 
ING-ING Belgium SA/NV 0.018 0.018 0 0.018 
  KBC Group 0.023 0.023 0.023 0 
France Crédit Mutuel 0.014 0.014 0 0.014 
 
BNP Paribas SA 0.166 0.027 0.144 0.022 
 
Caisse Centrale des Banques Populaires 0.013 0.013 0 0.013 
 
CNCE 0.019 0.019 0 0.019 
 
Crédit Agricole Group-Crédit Agricole 0.203 0.029 0.124 0.079 
 
Crédit Foncier de France 0.020 0.020 0 0.020 
 
Crédit Lyonnais 0.081 0.040 0.081 0 
 
Groupe Caisse d'Epargne 0.114 0.022 0 0.114 
 
HSBC France 0.098 0.032 0 0.098 
  Société Générale SA 0.481 0.028 0.431 0.050 
Germany Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank AG 0.118 0.029 0.053 0.065 
 
Bayerische LBS 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 
 
Commerzbank AG 0.097 0.032 0.076 0.021 
 
Deutsche Bank AG 0.091 0.030 0.091 0 
 
Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank DG 
BANK 0.060 0.030 0.036 0.024 
 
Deutsche Postbank AG 0.058 0.029 0 0.058 
 
Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank-
DZ Bank AG 0.030 0.030 0 0.030 
 
Dresdner Bank AG 0.073 0.036 0 0.073 
 
LBS Bausparkasse Schleswig-Holstein-
Hamburg AG 0.032 0.032 0 0.032 
  Nord LB  0.039 0.019 0 0.039 
- to be continued - 
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Country Bank name 
Total 
Subsidy 
Average 
Subsidy 
Cross-border 
Subsidy 
Domestic 
Subsidy 
Greece Alpha Bank SA 0.115 0.038 0.075 0.040 
 
EFG Eurobank Ergasias SA 0.147 0.029 0.074 0.073 
 
Marfin Egnatia Bank SA 0.030 0.030 0 0.030 
 
National Bank of Greece SA 0.170 0.034 0.140 0.030 
  Piraeus Bank SA 0.141 0.023 0.066 0.075 
Netherlands ABN Amro Holding NV 0.151 0.030 0.151 0 
  F. van Lanschot Bankiers NV 0.052 0.026 0 0.052 
Portugal 
Millennium bcp-Banco Comercial 
Português, SA 0.079 0.026 0.031 0.048 
  Banco Finantia SA 0.010 0.010 0.010 0 
Sweden Nordea Bank AB  0.108 0.038 0.077 0.031 
 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 0.060 0.030 0.060 0 
 
Svenska Handelsbanken 0.073 0.024 0.073 0 
  Swedbank AB 0.080 0.040 0.040 0.040 
UK Abbey National Plc 0.035 0.035 0 0.035 
 
Bank of Scotland Plc 0.024 0.024 0.024 0 
 
Barclays Bank Plc 0.063 0.031 0.035 0.028 
 
HSBC Holdings Plc 0.400 0.033 0.375 0.025 
 
Lloyds TSB Bank Plc 0 0 0 0 
 
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc 0.066 0.033 0.025 0.042 
  Standard Chartered Plc 0.224 0.037 0.224 0 
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Table VI. Determinants of banking merger premiums in 9 EU countries 
The table shows the results from the estimation of Equation [2] using a stochastic cost frontier model for a 
sample of 9 EU countries for the period of 1997 to 2007. Data are from Thomson One Banker and Bankscope. 
The dependent variable is PREM, which is the premium paid in merger deals. MPOW is the target’s Lerner 
Index divided by the acquirer’s Lerner Index and measures potential market power gains. RROA and RCIR 
measure profit and cost efficiency potential gains respectively: two variables are the ratios of target’s ROA or 
CIR divided by acquirer’s ROA or CIR, respectively. AGECY is the number of acquirer’s block shareholders. 
TLEV is the equity-to-asset ratio of the target in the fiscal year before the M&A announcement. TFOC is the 
ratio of the net interest income of the target to its total operating income the year prior to the transaction. 
TGROW is the target’s average assets growth rate over the three years prior to the merger. TCON is a target’s 
market 3-bank assets concentration measure CR3 the year before the merger. TSUP captures target’s home 
country’s supervisory strength. RSIZE is defined as the ratio of the sum of target's asset size and the acquirer's 
asset size divided by acquirer’s asset in the year preceding the merger. Z-statistics are in parentheses. Note: 
***/**/* indicates that the coefficient estimates are significantly different from zero at 1%/5%/10% level. 
Dependent variable:         PREM 
MPOW 0.158*** 
 (3.67) 
RROA 0.030 
 (0.52) 
RCIR 0.191 
 (1.29) 
AGECY 0.022 
 (0.44) 
TLEV 0.123 
 (1.11) 
TFOC -0.022 
 (-0.14) 
TGROW 0.222 
 (1.01) 
TSUP 0.733*** 
 (3.44) 
TCON 0.174* 
 (1.74) 
RSIZE -0.422 
 (-1.15) 
Ancillary statistics  
No. of observations:  162 
LR test of 𝜎𝑢
2 = 0 50.92*** 
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Table VII. Correlations between safety net subsidies and systemic importance indicators 
The table shows the correlation coefficients of safety net subsidies measured and various indicators that 
measure the systemic importance of a banking institution. Data are from Thomson One Banker and Bankscope. 
SUBD is the sum of the safety net benefits derived from the estimation of Equation [2] using a stochastic 
frontier model. ABSIZE is the natural logarithm of a bank’s assets in December 2007. MAKSH is the bank 
assets size divided by banking sector total assets in December 2007. COMP measures a bank’s complexity in 
December 2007 as the natural logarithm of the number of a bank’s total subsidiaries. ABCONN is the natural 
logarithm of a bank’s total interbank deposits in December 2007. RECONN is the ratio of a bank’s interbank 
deposits divided by total bank deposits (excluding its own share) in December 2007. P-values are in 
parentheses. 
 
SUBD ABSIZE MAKSH COMP ABCONN RECONN 
SUBD 1 - - - - - 
 
(0.0000) 
     ABSIZE 0.24 1 - - - - 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
    MAKSH 0.40 0.37 1 - - - 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   COMP 0.33 0.66 0.33 1 - - 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
  ABCONN 0.21 0.85 0.31 0.61 1 - 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
 RECONN 0.28 0.35 0.81 0.28 0.32 1 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
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Table VIII. Systemic risk implications of TSITF- a binomial probit regression analysis 
The table shows the marginal effects of probit estimations of Equation [4] defining TSITF banks as those rescued between 2008 and 2009. Dependent variable TSITF is 
a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the bank is defined as a TSITF bank and 0 otherwise. SUBD is the sum of the safety net benefits derived from the estimation of 
Equation [2] using a stochastic frontier model. ASUP and ADEP are a bank’s home country’s Supervisory Strength Index and Deposit Insurance Strength Index in 2007, 
respectively. Standard errors are clustered on the country level and in parentheses. Country dummies are included but not shown. Note: ***/**/* indicates that the coefficient 
estimates are significantly different from zero at 1%/5%/10% level. 
Dependent variable: Pr (TSITF bank/ non TSITF bank) 
SUBD 0.3148*** 
 (0.0457) 
ASUP 0.0024*** 
 (0.0000) 
ADEP 0.0017** 
 (0.0007) 
Country dummy  Yes 
Ancillary statistics  
Pseudo R
2
 34.75% 
Type I error 0.09% 
Type II error 80.03% 
Area under ROC curve 91.03% 
Correctly classified 98.77% 
Observations 4380 
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Table IX. Systemic risk implications of TSITF- a multinomial probit regression analysis 
The table shows marginal effects of multinomial probit estimations of Equation [4] defining TSITF banks as those rescued between 2008 and 2009. Dependent variable 
TSITF is multinomial taking the value of 1 if an acquiring bank is defined as a non-TSITF bank, 2 for a TSITF bank rescued by being provided with state guarantees and 3 
for a TSITF bank rescued via recapitalization including nationalization and forced mergers. In each estimation, TSITF=1 is specified as the base outcome. SUBD is the sum 
of the safety net benefits from the estimation of Equation [2] using a stochastic frontier model. ASUP and ADEP are acquiring bank’s home country’s Supervisory Strength 
Index and Deposit Insurance Strength Index in 2007 respectively. Standard errors are clustered on the country level and in parentheses. Note: ***/**/* indicates that the 
coefficient estimates are significantly different from zero at 1%/5%/10% level. 
Outcome State guarantees Recapitalization 
SUBD 0.1600** 0.3510* 
 (0.0739) (0.1812) 
ASUP 0 .0028** 0.0019 
 (0.0011) (0.0028) 
ADEP 0.0051* -0.0022 
 (0.0028) (0.0104) 
Ancillary statistics  
Wald χ2 91.02*** 
Observations 4380 
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Table X. Systemic risk implications of TSITF- robustness test I-V 
Panel A shows the marginal effects of probit estimations of Equation [4] defining TSITF banks as those rescued between 2008 and 2009. Dependent variable TSITF is a dummy variable, 
which takes the value of 1 if a bank is defined as a TSITF bank and 0 for a non-TSITF bank. SUBD is the sum of the safety net benefits derived from estimation of Equation [2] using OLS 
regression. ASUP and ADEP are a bank’s home country’s Supervisory Strength Index and Deposit Insurance Strength Index in 2007, respectively. Standard errors are clustered on the country 
level and in parentheses. Country dummies are included but not shown.  
Panel B shows the regression results of Equation [4] defining TSITF banks as bank’s total assets weighted by its home country’s GDP in 2007. SUBD is the sum of the safety net benefits 
derived from the estimation of Equation [2] using a stochastic frontier model. ASUP and ADEP are a bank’s home country’s Supervisory Strength Index and Deposit Insurance Strength Index 
in 2007, respectively. Standard errors are clustered on the country level and in parentheses. Country dummies are included but not shown.  
Panel C shows the marginal effects from probit estimations of Equation [4] defining TSITF banks as those rescued between 2008 and 2009 for two sub-samples. Sub-sample I includes 
Austria, Belgium, Greece, Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden; Sub-sample II includes France, Germany and the UK. Dependent variable TSITF is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 
if a bank is defined as a TSITF bank and 0 for a non-TSITF bank. SUBD is the sum of the safety net benefits derived from estimation of Equation [2] using a stochastic frontier model. ASUP 
and ADEP are a bank’s home country’s Supervisory Strength Index and Deposit Insurance Strength Index in 2007, respectively. Standard errors are clustered on the country level and in 
parentheses. Country dummies are included but not shown.  
Panel D shows a two-stage test for exogeneity of SUBD in the probit estimations of Equation [4]. We run the first stage OLS regression SUBD (the safety net benefits) on two instrumental 
variables: MAVAL (bank’s total M&A deal value) and MANUM (deal number) in natural logarithm between 1997 and 2008. We save the residuals RESID for our second stage probit 
estimation. We then present the marginal effects of the second stage of probit estimations of Equation [4]. TSITF is the dependent variable, which is a dummy variable and takes the value of 1 
if a bank is defined as a TSITF bank and 0 for a non-TSITF bank between 2008 and 2009. SUBD is the sum of the safety net benefits derived from estimation of Equation [2] using a stochastic 
frontier model. RESID is the residuals derived from first stage OLS regressions. For reasons of brevity, the control variables are not shown. Standard errors are clustered on the country level and 
in parentheses. Country dummies are included but not shown.  
Panel E shows the marginal effects of probit estimations of Equation [4] defining TSITF banks as those rescued between 2008 and 2009. Dependent variable TSITF is a dummy variable, 
which takes the value of 1 if a bank is defined as a TSITF bank and 0 for a non-TSITF bank. CROSUBD is the sum of the cross-border merger deals’ safety net benefits derived from estimation 
of Equation [2] using a stochastic frontier model. DOMSUBD is the sum of the domestic merger deals’ safety net benefits derived from estimation of Equation [2] using a stochastic frontier 
model. ASUP and ADEP are a bank’s home country’s Supervisory Strength Index and Deposit Insurance Strength Index in 2007, respectively. Standard errors are clustered on the country level 
and in parentheses. Country dummies are included but not shown. 
Panel F shows the marginal effects of probit estimations of Equation [4] defining TSITF banks as those rescued between 2008 and 2009. Dependent variable TSITF is a dummy variable, 
which takes the value of 1 if a bank is defined as a TSITF bank and 0 for a non-TSITF bank. AVSUBD is the mean value of the safety net benefits derived from estimation of Equation [2] using 
OLS regression. ASUP and ADEP are a bank’s home country’s Supervisory Strength Index and Deposit Insurance Strength Index in 2007, respectively. Standard errors are clustered on the 
country level and in parentheses. Country dummies are included but not shown.  
Panel G shows the marginal effects of probit estimations of Equation [4] defining TSITF banks as those rescued between 2008 and 2009. Dependent variable TSITF is a dummy variable, 
which takes the value of 1 if a bank is defined as a TSITF bank and 0 for a non-TSITF bank. BANKSUBD is the sum of the bank merger deals’ safety net benefits derived from estimation of 
Equation [2] using a stochastic frontier model. NBANKSUB is the sum of the non-bank merger deals’ safety net benefits derived from estimation of Equation [2] using a stochastic frontier 
model. ASUP and ADEP are a bank’s home country’s Supervisory Strength Index and Deposit Insurance Strength Index in 2007, respectively. Standard errors are clustered on the country level 
and in parentheses. Country dummies are included but not shown. 
 
 Note: ***/**/* indicates that the coefficient estimates are significantly different from zero at 1%/5%/10% level. 
 
48 
 
 
Panel A: Robustness test I Panel B: Robustness test II Panel C: Robustness test III Panel D: Robustness test IV 
Stage one 
Dependent 
variable: 
Pr (TSITF 
bank/ non 
TSITF bank) 
Dependent 
variable: 
Asset/GDP Dependent 
variable: 
Pr (TSITF bank/ non TSITF 
bank) 
Dependent 
variable: 
SUBD 
SUBD 0.01479*** SUBD 4.0574* SUBD 1.1006*** 0.2514*** MAVAL -0.0166*** 
 (0.0044)  (1.8583)  (0.2724) (0.0418)  (0.0035) 
ASUP 0.0027*** ASUP 0.0026*** ASUP 0.0457*** 0.0039*** MANUM 0.1684*** 
 (0.0003)  (0.0000)  (0.0022) (0.0003)  (0.0210) 
ADEP 0.0021 ADEP 0.0363*** ADEP 0.2072*** 0.0066*** Country dummy Yes 
 (0.0014)  (0.0009) 
 
(0.0113) (0.0003)   𝑅2 86.96% 
Country dummy  Yes Country dummy  Yes Country dummy  Yes Yes Observations 4380 
Pseudo R2 25.12%  R2 12.72%  Sub-sample I Sub-sample II Stage Two 
Observations 4378 Observations 4380 
Pseudo R2 26.35% 32.61% 
Dependent 
variable: 
Pr (TSITF bank/ 
non TSITF bank) 
    Observations 782 3598 SUBD 0.2949*** 
        (0.0468) 
       RESID -0.1106 
        (0.08137)  
       Control variables Yes 
       Country dummy Yes 
       Pseudo 𝑅
2 35.01% 
       Observations 4380 
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Panel E: Robustness test V Panel F: Robustness test VI Panel G: Robustness test VII 
Dependent 
variable: 
Pr (TSITF bank/ non TSITF bank) Dependent variable: Pr (TSITF bank/ non 
TSITF bank) 
Dependent 
variable: 
Pr (TSITF bank/ 
non TSITF bank) 
CROSUBD 0.3076*** 0.3983***  AVSUBD 0.9101*** BANKSUBD 0.2932*** 
 (0.0790) (0.0901)   (0.0394)  (0.0436) 
DOMSUBD 0.3260***  0.5421*** ASUP 0.0023*** NBANKSUBD 0.4443** 
 (0.0804)  (0.0760)  (0.0001)  (0.2068) 
ASUP 0.0024*** 0.0027*** 0.0018*** ADEP 0.0011 ASUP 0.0023 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)  (0.0008)  (0.0001) 
ADEP 0.0017** 0.0013*** 0.0041*** Country dummy  Yes ADEP 0.0020 
 (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0003) Pseudo R2 36.61%  (0.0007) 
Country 
dummy  
Yes Yes Yes Observations 4380 Country dummy Yes 
Pseudo R2 34.76% 32.67% 26.34%   Pseudo R2 34.80% 
Observations 4380 4380 4380   Observations 4380 
        
        
        
        
        
        
 
 
 
50 
 
Table XI. Determinants of banking merger premiums in the EU – Robustness test 
The table shows the results from the estimation of Equation [2] with two additional variables: LGBONUS 
and AGE using a stochastic cost frontier model for a sample of 9 EU countries for the period of 1997 to 2007. 
LGBONUS is the logarithmic transformation of 1 plus the total cash bonus received by the CEO. AGE is the log 
transformation of CEO age. Other variables remain unchanged. Z-statistics are in parentheses. Note: ***/**/* 
indicates that the coefficient estimates are significantly different from zero at 1%/5%/10% level. 
 
 
Dependent variable:  PREM 
MPOW 0.103 
 (1.31) 
RROA 0.168 
 (1.28) 
RCIR 0.230 
 (0.54) 
AGECY 0.024 
 (0.44) 
TLEV -0.140 
 (-0.64) 
TFOC -0.279 
 (-1.14) 
TGROW 0.721 
 (1.53) 
TSUP 0.826* 
 (1.84) 
TCON 0.241 
 (1.17) 
RSIZE -1.843 
 (-0.87) 
LGBONUS 0.001 
 (0.02) 
AGE 1.748 
 (1.07) 
Ancillary statistics  
No. of observations:  54 
LR test of 𝜎𝑢
2 = 0 22.82** 
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Table XII. Correlation between safety net subsidy gains and change in interdependency 
This table shows the correlation between TSITF bank’s safety net subsidies gained in an M&A transaction 
and the change in interdependency with other TSITF banks in the same country. SUBD is the safety net benefits 
from the estimation of Equation [2] using a stochastic frontier model. Change in total interdependency 
(∆INDEP) is calculated by the year-on-year percentage change of bivariate share return correlations with a 
bank’s peer. 
Country Year TSITF bank SUBDt ΔINDEPt+1 
Austria 2006 Volksbanken Holding 
0.043 0.002 
Austria 2006 RZB  AG 
0.039 -0.210 
Austria 2005 RZB  AG 
0.046 0.150 
Belgium 2007 KBC Groep NV 
0.023 -0.152 
Belgium 2006 Dexia 
0.026 0.008 
Belgium 2005 Fortis SA/NV 
0.038 0.220 
Belgium 2003 ING Belgium Bank 
0.018 -0.224 
Belgium 2000 Dexia SA 
0.036 0.116 
France 2007 BNP Paribas SA 
0.028 0.016 
France 2007 Société Générale SA 
0.019 0.059 
France 2007 Société Générale SA 
0.022 0.059 
France 2006 Crédit Agricole SA 
0.023 0.145 
France 2006 Crédit Agricole SA 
0.042 0.145 
France 2006 Société Générale SA 
0.026 0.103 
France 2006 BNP Paribas SA 
0.017 0.119 
France 2006 Société Générale SA 
0.030 0.103 
France 2005 Société Générale SA 
0.036 0.092 
France 2005 Société Générale SA 
0.025 0.092 
France 2004 Société Générale SA 
0.008 0.012 
France 2004 Société Générale SA 
0.031 0.012 
France 2003 BNP Paribas SA 
0.032 -0.118 
France 2002 Crédit Agricole 
0.038 -0.092 
France 2002 Crédit Agricole SA 
0.033 -0.092 
France 2002 Société Générale SA 
0.030 -0.097 
France 2001 BNP Paribas SA 
0.033 0.119 
France 2001 BNP Paribas SA 
0.024 0.119 
France 2001 BNP Paribas SA 
0.028 0.119 
France 2001 Société Générale SA 
0.035 0.131 
France 1999 Société Générale SA 
0.045 0.240 
France 1998 Société Générale SA 
0.009 -0.300 
France 1997 Société Générale SA 
0.041 0.079 
France 1997 Société Générale SA 
0.024 0.079 
France 1997 Société Générale SA 
0.028 0.079 
- to be continued - 
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Country Year TSITF bank SUBDt ΔINDEPt+1 
Germany 2007 Commerzbank AG 
0.047 0.169 
Germany 2005 Commerzbank AG 
0.021 0.169 
Germany 2001 Commerzbank AG 
0.029 0.023 
Germany 1998 Deutsche Bank AG 
0.016 -0.062 
Germany 1998 Deutsche Bank AG 
0.032 -0.062 
Greece 2006 EFG Eurobank Ergasias SA 
0.041 -0.078 
Greece 2006 National Bank of Greece SA 
0.036 -0.038 
Greece 2006 EFG Eurobank Ergasias SA 
0.033 -0.078 
Greece 2006 National Bank of Greece SA 
0.037 -0.038 
Greece 2005 Piraeus Bank SA 
0.021 0.036 
Greece 2005 Alpha Bank AE 
0.043 0.013 
Greece 2005 Piraeus Bank SA 
0.026 0.036 
Greece 2003 National Bank of Greece SA 
0.030 -0.093 
Greece 2003 Piraeus Bank SA 
0.019 -0.066 
Greece 2001 Piraeus Bank SA 
0.007 -0.245 
Greece 2001 EFG Eurobank Ergasias SA 
0.02 -0.182 
Greece 2000 National Bank of Greece SA 
0.037 -0.018 
Greece 1999 Piraeus Bank SA 
0.043 -0.582 
Greece 1999 Piraeus Bank SA 
0.025 -0.582 
Greece 1999 Alpha Credit Bank 
0.032 0.024 
Greece 1998 National Bank of Greece SA 
0.030 -0.007 
Greece 1998 EFG Eurobank SA 
0.025 0.046 
Greece 1998 EFG Eurobank SA 
0.028 0.046 
Sweden 2007 Svenska Handelsbanken AB 
0.019 0.116 
Sweden 2006 Swedbank AB 
0.040 -0.014 
Sweden 2006 Nordea Bank AB 
0.044 0.004 
Sweden 2001 Nordbanken 
0.031 0.143 
Sweden 2001 Svenska Handelsbanken AB 
0.023 0.111 
Sweden 2000 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken 
0.033 0.262 
Sweden 1999 Nordbanken Holding AB 
0.033 -0.037 
Sweden 1999 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken 
0.027 0.029 
Sweden 1999 Svenska Handelsbanken AB 
0.031 0.047 
Sweden 1997 Swedbank 
0.040 0.220 
- to be continued - 
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Country Year TSITF bank SUBDt ΔINDEPt+1 
UK 2007 Standard Chartered PLC 
0.022 -0.107 
UK 2006 Standard Chartered Bank PLC 
0.048 0.147 
UK 2006 HSBC Holdings PLC 
0.041 0.182 
UK 2006 HSBC Holdings PLC 
0.030 0.182 
UK 2005 Standard Chartered PLC 
0.044 0.111 
UK 2004 HSBC Holdings PLC 
0.025 -0.066 
UK 2003 HSBC Holdings PLC 
0.037 -0.076 
UK 2003 RBS Group PLC 
0.025 -0.105 
UK 2002 HSBC Holdings PLC 
0.025 -0.076 
UK 2002 HSBC Holdings PLC 
0.035 -0.076 
UK 2001 HSBC Bank PLC 
0.036 0.076 
UK 2000 Bank of Scotland PLC 
0.024 0.199 
UK 2000 HSBC Holdings PLC 
0.045 0.221 
UK 2000 Standard Chartered PLC 
0.023 0.123 
UK 2000 HSBC Holdings PL 
0.035 0.221 
UK 1999 Royal Bank of Scotland Group 
0.041 0.013 
UK 1999 Standard Chartered Bank PLC 
0.042 -0.043 
UK 1999 HSBC Holdings PLC 
0.037 -0.176 
UK 1999 HSBC Holdings PLC 
0.032 -0.176 
  Correlation coefficient: 0.08  
  Significance level 47.01%  
 
 
